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Towards a New International Economic Architecture: 
Principles and Policies
Joseph E. Stiglitz
We have seen the worldwide financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 
mushroom since its modest beginnings in Thailand on July 2 of last 
year. It flared up in Indonesia last October, spread through “contagion” 
to Latin America and Russia later that month, built through the crisis in 
Korea in December, and finally reached full conflagration in the 
summer of 1998. Then, the collapse of the ruble and soaring risk 
premiums threatened to bring down currencies even in countries that 
had seemingly pursued sound economic policies. This sequence of events 
has led to a re-examination of fundamental questions concerning the 
international economic architecture. While all would recognize now that 
unrestricted capital flows are not an unmitigated blessing, some are 
asking a more probing question: Are the net benefits of such flows 
worth the costs? Have countries put into place institutions and policies 
that can cope with the risks they impose? Have we proceeded with 
reforms in a balanced way, so that developments in our ability to absorb 
and respond to shocks could keep pace with the increases in risks to 
which we have exposed especially the least developed countries? And 
most importantly, has the international community put into place 
institutions and policies that can help stabilize these flows and effectively 
control and limit the damage the crises when they occur?
Points of consensus
In this lecture, I want to push forward the current international debate 
on these issues. That debate has all too often been dominated by 
ideological -  and in some cases intellectually incoherent -  positions, 
rather than carefully reasoned analyses based on consistent theories and 
available evidence. Fortunately, there is a growing consensus concerning 
at least the intellectual framework within which these questions should 
be addressed. I want to try to articulate this framework, which can be 
summarized in the following six propositions: 1
1. International capital markets are rife with market failures: 
information is imperfect; instabilities in capital flows have 
systemic effects that harm even those who have not actively 




























































































individuals cannot insure against these risks; and for these and 
other reasons, social and private risk diverge markedly.
2. These market failures are not just a matter of academic 
interest, but have real consequences. They are associated with 
high levels of economic instability, with extended periods of 
severe underutilization of resources, all worsened by an inability 
to distribute efficiently the burden of the resulting risks.1
3. A variety of government actions (at the national and 
international levels) can help mitigate these market failures and 
their consequences. Market failures have real consequences.
4. In many cases, policies of governments and the international 
community may have served to exacerbate the market failures, 
even if at the same time, some of these policies worked to mitigate 
their consequences. (This is the so-called “moral hazard” 
problem.)
5. Even with the best policies and institutions, crises will occur. 
Our objective should be to try to reduce their frequency and 
magnitude and mitigate their consequences.
6. The policy responses to the financial crises of the past year 
largely failed in their objectives, including crisis containment.
Areas o f controversy
But there remain important controversies;
1. What are the most important market failures, and how large 
are they?
2. What role do “government” failures play, and what can we do 
to overcome those failures? Here, I am interpreting “government 
failures” broadly, so that it includes both the moral hazard 
induced by poorly designed bailouts and mismanagement of
' For instance, while the typical recession entails only a modest reduction in GDP, the 
consequences are perceived to be far more severe than this number might suggest, 
partly because the incidence of the reduced demand for labor hours is not evenly 
distributed, but also partly because there are high social costs arising from the 
absence of adequate mechanisms by which the risks can be distributed widely and 
transferred from the poor (who typically bear a disproportionate share of the burden) 




























































































macro-economic and structural policies (such as the regulation of 
financial sector).
3. Why did the policies aimed at addressing the crises fail? 
Raising this question opens the door to several others: Would the 
crises have been even worse in the absence of these policies -  so 
that while they failed to contain the crises, the policies improved 
matters relative to the relevant counterfactual! Or did they 
actually exacerbate the crises? And if so, would they have 
worked, but for the failure of the governments involved to live up 
to their agreements? Finally, to what extent should the design of 
crisis responses take into account the willingness and ability of 
governments to implement agreements -  and when should 
implementation failure be accepted as a defense of failed policies? 
In short, to what extent should policy makers take into account 
political economy considerations and the social consequences of 
what follows upon their advice, and be held accountable for their 
failure or success in doing so?
4. Are there policies and structures (institutions) that can bring 
social and private costs and benefits of risk-taking into alignment, 
without adverse ancillary consequences? More broadly, are there 
effective means of reducing market failures and mitigating their 
consequences, of reducing economic volatility, and of protecting 
the poor protected from the risks associated with economic 
volatility? Can these approaches ensure a more equitable sharing 
of the costs of instability, including the costs of adjustment?
Let me say a word about each of the first three controversies in turn, 
before turning to the fourth question, which is the focus of this paper. 
In answer to the first question, some argue that there are only “limited 
market failures” requiring only limited government action and that 
more extensive government action is likely to be associated with 
substantia] negative side-effects. In short, according to this view, only 
minor modifications of the current regime are needed; we simply need 
to do better what we have already been trying to do. I shall argue, on 
the contrary, that the market failures are serious, that the externalities 
are large and the consequences of an absence of risk markets are grave, 
and that under the current regime, the benefits of short-term capital 
flows and more broadly capital-market liberalization may well not 
justify the associated risks.
At the same time, I am rather pessimistic about the possibility that 




























































































framework can go far to reduce the risks imposed by financial and 
capital market liberalization and to mitigate their consequences. The 
international economic architecture cannot be designed on the 
assumption that all governments are perfect or near perfect! Nuclear 
reactors and airplanes are both designed to be run by fallible humans, 
with a variety of safety provisions to guard against human error (as well 
as mechanical failures). The possibility of “mistakes” in economic policy 
-  especially in cases of collective actions taken under considerable 
uncertainty, when even professional economists do not agree on the 
appropriate action -  is all the greater. But it is pointless to assign blame: 
Was it the design of the airplane, which made it all too vulnerable to 
human error, or the human error itself which should be blamed for the 
crash? Both are, in some sense, to blame. But if a plane is too sensitive 
to human error, and if as a result there are frequent crashes, surely all 
would agree that there should be alterations in the design of the 
airplane. In most instances, we can address the problem more effectively 
through such a redesign than by trying to eliminate human fallibility. 
The evidence of frequent -  increasingly frequent -  and ubiquitous 
financial crises suggests that at least the economic architecture suffers 
from some deficiencies.
This human and institutional fallibility extends beyond the actions that 
might prevent a crisis to those associated with responding to it. There is 
now widespread agreement that the actions taken, say, in response to the 
crisis in Indonesia and some of the other East Asian countries was far 
from optimal: at least from an ex post perspective (and arguably also 
from an ex ante perspective), governments adopted fiscal policies that 
were excessively contractionary.
Indeed, the problem of human fallibility has been well illustrated by 
many of the intellectual arguments that have been put forward for and 
against changes in the international architecture. If, as the old saw has it, 
consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds,2 then few small minds have 
entered the fray.
Intellectual Inconsistencies and
the Foundations of the Architecture Debate
To be sure, a few commentators have stood out with an intellectually 
consistent -  if flawed -  position. They have argued that markets work
2 While Emerson’s original statement of this proposition was that “a foolish 
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds,” the argument here is that much of the 




























































































perfectly, or at least that any imperfections are likely to be exacerbated 
by government intervention. They have argued that exchange rates, like 
other prices, should be left to the free market; that monetary policy 
should be governed by strict rules, since discretionary policy is likely to 
exacerbate fluctuations rather than dampen them; that there is no place 
for bailouts in a market economy; and that there is no place for 
government regulation in financial markets. There are four premises 
underlying this position:
• Markets yield (Pareto-) efficient outcomes.
• Anything the government can do, the market can do just as 
well.
• Government policies are likely be ineffective.
• Government policies, even if they have an effect, are likely to 
be counterproductive.
The first three propositions are theoretical; and although true under 
highly restrictive conditions, they are not in general true. Whenever 
information is imperfect or markets incomplete -  in other words, 
always -  markets are not even constrained Pareto-efficient.3 The 
government has powers that are not available to other (legal, voluntary) 
institutions, and so it can take actions that the private sector cannot;4 
moreover, the actions of the government can be undone by the private 
sector only under highly restrictive conditions. The last proposition is 
harder to deal with. There is a need for public goods, so there is a need 
for government, at the very minimum to provide the institutional 
infrastructure that is required to make markets work.5 The question is, 
what is the appropriate role? The historical record is only partially 
relevant, since evolutions in policies and institutions may have improved 
government performance. While the theory of rent seeking and public 
choice has provided explanations for why we should expect 
inefficiencies within the public sector, modern theory has shown that 
rent-seeking may be less important in the public sector and more 
important in the private sector than previously thought.6
Most of the participants in the debate over economic architecture agree 
that there is a role for government. But there are those who, while 
grudgingly admitting the need for government and recognizing the 
existence of important market failures, circumscribe that role in ways 
that are not (and I suspect cannot be) defended on grounds of either
3 Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
4 Stiglitz (1989).
5 World Bank (1997).




























































































theory or evidence. They argue that with a few exceptions markets 
should be relied upon, and government intervention is likely to lead to a 
worsening of outcomes. The exceptions include:
• International bailouts
• Interventions in the foreign exchange market
• International surveillance of capital movements
• Regulation of financial institutions through capital-adequacy 
requirements
The argument for bailouts is that without them, contagion may result; an 
alternative argument is that even firms or countries with positive net 
worth may face liquidity crises. The argument for intervening in the 
foreign exchange market is that otherwise markets may exhibit excess 
volatility, thereby destabilizing the economy. The argument for 
international surveillance is that the information it provides can lead to 
better investment decisions, thereby reducing the likelihood of capital- 
flow reversals like those that rocked East Asia. The argument for 
financial sector regulation is that it can prevent financial- market 
crashes that have systemic effects, and capital-adequacy standards are 
justified as providing strong incentives without distorting resource 
allocation.
While each of these arguments may seem plausible, closer examination 
reveals that the overall stance is full of intellectual inconsistencies. 
Underlying each of the interventions is the belief in a market failure. 
But there exist neither theorems nor evidence to suggest that if the 
market failure is sufficiently important to warrant the accepted 
intervention, the interventions should be limited to the suggested means. 
Once we admit that market failures exist, we should be willing to accept 
the full consequences of this admission, rather than artificially 
circumscribing whole sets of interventions.
Contagion, externalities, bailouts, and capital-market liberalization
Consider the international bailouts, which are justified on the basis of 
contagion. Once one admits the possibility of contagion, one admits that 
there are externalities associated with capital flows and their reversals; 
and once one acknowledges the externalities, there is a presumption in 
favor of actions to reduce the externality-generating activity. It is 
simply intellectually incoherent to say that interventions are justified by 
the possibility of contagion, and yet argue for free capital flows as a 
matter of principle. To be sure, one might argue as a practical matter 




























































































be designed to correct the market failure, but that is a far harder case to 
make.
Or consider the alternative argument for a lender-of-last-resort 
interpretation of bailouts -  that recipient countries or firms suffer from 
a lack of liquidity. What does it mean to lack liquidity? It means that 
lenders are not willing to provide capital, or at least to provide it at a 
“reasonable interest rate.” And what does a bailout entail? Replacing the 
market’s judgment with the judgment of national or international 
bureaucrats! Ironically, those making the decisions are often the same 
international bureaucrats who on other occasions declare not only the 
supremacy of markets but also the incompetence of (other) government 
bureaucrats. Yet it seems that these bureaucrats have -  or, more 
accurately, believe they have -  judgment superior to that of the markets.
Implicit in their analysis -  as well as underlying some of the rationale 
for intervention in exchange rate markets -  is the belief that markets 
may exhibit excess volatility -  beyond a level that can be justified by 
fundamentals. There is indeed considerable evidence for that view.7 8 But 
note, that if markets can be excessively pessimistic about some 
investment prospects or some country, so too can they be excessively 
optimistic.
The point is a simple one: if one believes that one should substitute a 
bureaucrat’s judgment for the market’s in some instances, isn’t it 
plausible that the market’s judgments should be questioned in other 
instances?
Similarly, if it is desirable to intervene to avoid the consequences of 
excessively pessimistic perceptions, so too may it be desirable to 
intervene to avoid the consequences of excessively optimistic 
perceptions, such as those that lead to real estate bubbles. Should we 
accept the market’s enthusiasm for investing in empty office buildings -  
letting those market-driven decisions crowd out investments in growth­
enhancing plant and equipment? Should we continue to do so despite the 
lesson from country after country that real estate is prone to bubbles, 
that those bubbles always break, and that when they do they damage the 
entire economy? Thailand had had restrictions on bank lending to real
7 Note that in the case of a bailout of a single firm or bank under the “too big to fail” 
doctrine, there is another market failure: in the competitive paradigm, each firm 
should be so small that any action that it takes will have a negligible effect on 
markets.




























































































estate, motivated both by the belief that investments in plant and 
equipment are more likely to generate growth than are investments in 
real estate, and by the recognition that speculative real estate investments 
have often been a source of macro-economic instability. But Thailand 
was persuaded to abandon these restrictions, on the grounds that they 
interfered with the market, and thereby presumably also with the 
efficient allocation of capital. This regulatory move is now recognized 
to have been an important factor contributing to the crisis.9 10(Indeed, 
there is by now a body of theory explaining why financial liberalization 
might be expected to lead to financial and economic crises; and evidence 
suggesting that this has in fact happened.)
Note that there are in fact important interactions between the first and 
second arguments; if there were no systemic effects, excessive optimism 
on the part of investors would lead them to lose money, but the matter 
would end there. Those investors alone would bear the costs of their 
own mistakes. But not so here; the crises have clearly had huge effects 
on millions who never gambled a bhat in the Thai real estate market.
Exchange-rate interventions
Similar problems arise in the analysis of exchange-rate interventions, 
which involve a certain irony. It is commonplace for those in a 
particular industry to claim, while praising the virtues of the market in 
general, that they need special protection or government intervention; 
without it, they argue, there will be excess competition or volatility. 
Capital markets are no different in this regard; there seems a 
widespread acceptance of the role of government in stabilizing exchange 
rates, while condemning other government interventions. Never mind 
the theorems that assert the impossibility of destabilizing speculation, 
and thus of any need for a government role as stabilizer.19 Never mind 
that by intervening, governments are substituting a bureaucrat’s 
judgment of the “correct” exchange rate for the judgment of those who
9 See Furman and Stiglitz [1998a]. To be sure, other policies may have contributed to 
the country’s vulnerability, and the policy responses may have exacerbated the 
consequences.
10 To be sure, even if those who engage in destabilizing exchange rate are “eliminated” 
by a Darwinian process, so long as there is a flow of new, excessively optimistic 
speculators into the market, speculators can continue to play a destablizing role. See 
Farrell (1970). The controversy over Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir’s criticism 
of speculators is enlightening in this perspective. Mahatir was roundly attacked 
when he accused speculators of destabilizing Malaysia’s currency. (There was a 
suggestion in his remarks that the speculators had nefarious motives; our concern 
here is not with motives but consequences.) Yet government interventions in the 
exchange rate market are widely accepted, presumably because most observers 




























































































are willing to put their own money (rather than the public’s money) on 
the line!" Let me be clear: I am not taking a position here on the 
desirability of exchange-rate intervention, but only on the intellectual 
consistency of those who advocate free-market positions in general, yet 
at the same time argue for and defend interventions in the foreign 
exchange market.
Some defenders of exchange-rate intervention argue that it has in fact 
not cost the government anything. (Evidence on this question is mixed.) 
But if exchange-rate intervention is profitable, this is evidence that there 
is an important market failure.12 And if there is a market failure, why 
should there be a presumption that exchange-rate intervention is the 
only, or even the best, instrument for dealing with it?
Transparency and hypocrisy
Upon viewing the East Asia turmoil, many observers have called for the 
region to adopt a policy of greater transparency. I suspect that the 
motives behind this stance may not themselves be fully transparent; we 
can easily, however, deduce two of them. First, the call for transparency 
requires no money from the more advanced countries, and little action 
on their part. Second, this view lets the investment houses and banks in 
developed countries off the hook. After all, if these market participants 
were so smart, they would not have made these bad investments and 
loans; the only possible explanation is that investors lacked access to the 
requisite information, due to a lack of disclosure by borrowers. But we 
should look at this argument with some suspicion. The lenders had an 
obligation to do due diligence, and if needed information was not 
available, they should not have made the loans or investments.
Skepticism about the emphasis on transparency has been heightened by 
the actions of developed-country governments, which have often done 
little to make more transparent key and clearly relevant information. 
Examples include an unwillingness to reduce the secrecy surrounding 
the discussions and voting of the committees that set monetary policy,
"  The evidence on whether bureaucrats are right in those judgements—specifically, on 
whether they make a profit—is mixed at best. According to Dominguez and Frankel 
(1993, p. 107), “[p]rofit calculations [of exchange rate interventions] are extremely 
sensitive to the time period over which they are measured and the method by which 
interest earnings are measured.”
12 Indeed, with perfect capital markets, all financial actions by the government have no 
consequence. This is the extension of the Barro-Ricardo theorem to more general 
actions.
15 The U.K.’s recent initiatives in this direction are an exception to the general pattern. 




























































































to change accounting standards to reflect obligations under deferred 
compensation/stock options,* 14 or to improve the accounting standards of 
banks (e.g., marking to market assets, especially those for which there 
are readily available market prices).15
Or consider the recent developed-country bailout (privately financed but 
government-orchestrated) of a domestic U.S. firm imperiled by 
derivatives trading. In this case, Western banks and the firm to which 
they lent have loudly declared that they had no obligation to provide 
information their portfolio positions on a regular basis, raising 
justifiable suspicions that a dual standard is at work.16 In the face of 
these bailouts, why have we not heard again the voices of those 
governments and international institutions that called so loudly for 
transparency during the East Asian crisis?17 What message does their 
silence send to Asia and to the rest of the world?
The tendency to blame only borrowing countries is consistent with the 
heavy emphasis immediately after the crisis hit on the weaknesses of the 
financial institutions in the developing country. This emphasis ignored
effects its critics had suggested might follow.
14 FASB actually proposed a change to increase transparency in this arena, but was 
soundly attacked by the U.S. Treasury and other government officials. Not only 
was that a blatant attempt to politicize a process that had been deliberately structured 
to be non-political, but it was misguided: surely, the best estimate of the value of 
these liabilities is not zero. To be sure, there are difficulties of provided an accurate 
estimate, but rather than focusing on attempts to provide a more accurate estimate, or 
even a conservative estimate (one such methodology was in fact developed 
advocated by another U.S. government agency), a decision was made to support 
those who did not want an improvement in transparency.
15 Such proposals gained currency in the United States in the aftermath of the S&L 
crisis, but were soundly resisted by U.S. government officials. There were 
legitimate concerns about the fact that not all assets would be marked to market, and 
this could have distortionary effects; but there are large distortionary effects (going 
beyond the lack of transparency) associated with the current regime. See Stiglitz 
(1992) and Kane and Yu (1996). Equally telling is the way that regulatory 
authorities have handled risk. Below, I raise some further reservations.
16 There is some suspicion that some of these so-called arbitrage activities were not risk 
arbitrage so much as tax arbitrage; in retrospect, it is clear that they were not fully 
hedged.
17 The Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout also raised issues of corporate 
governance, crony capitalism, and the adequacy of bank regulation, as recent 
Financial Times articles have pointed out (Plender (1998)). Several circumstances 
raised at least an appearance of crony capitalism when the Federal Reserve acted to 
arrange the bailout. First, one of LTCM’s partners was a former vice-chair of the 
Fed. Second, the CEOs of at least some of the companies participating in the bailout 
had personal positions in the company being bailed out by their companies. And 
finally, bank lending to a firm with the kind of reported exposure of LTCM raises 
severe questions about prudential behavior (questions corroborated, in fact, by the 




























































































the elementary theorem that every loan has a borrower and a lender, 
and that the lender shares, in some sense, equal culpability for a “bad” 
loan with the borrower. In the case of the Korean loans, where the 
heavy debt-equity ratios of Korean banks and their borrowers was 
already well known before they made those loans, the lenders’ 
culpability may even be greater. And the risk management systems of 
the more developed countries should have been far better than those in 
place in Korea.
But there is a more fundamental inconsistency here. Recall that the 
central theorems underlying the belief in a decentralized market 
economy argue that prices convey all of the relevant information. With 
well-functioning markets, the kind of information that some are calling 
for -  aggregate data on aggregate capital flows -  would simply not be 
required. That such information is viewed as important itself indicates a 
belief in a market failure. The market failure needs to be identified, and 
it has to be established that the most effective way of addressing it is 
through a disclosure requirement enabling the calculation of certain 
aggregate statistics. The fact that such information -  about aggregate 
production of steel or cars, say -  is not viewed as necessary for the 
effective functioning of other markets is consistent with the view that 
capital markets are different in essential ways from other markets. I 
strongly agree with this view, but it has clearly not been internalized by 
those who, in pressing for capital market liberalization, use the analogy 
that capital is just like any other commodity. According to this analogy, 
just as free trade in goods and services enhances welfare, so too should 
free movements of capital.
Let me be clear: I support moves towards greater transparency and 
improved auditing standards. Indeed, even before these policy measures 
had become fashionable, I had argued that improved auditing standards 
had played a critical role in the development of modern capitalism, by 
allowing the development of an equity market.18
Financial-sector liberalization
The final example of an intellectual inconsistency concerns financial 
market liberalization. There are a few diehard free-marketeers who 
advocate “free banking” -  a financial sector without prudential 
regulation. But their numbers are limited, simply because this position 
seems at odds with the evidence on the costs and benefits of free 
banking. The history of U.S. banking failures in the decades prior to the




























































































Civil War made clear the risks associated with this “free”-market 
solution; the subsequent century has provided abundant worldwide 
evidence of these risks (in Chile in the 1980s, for example).
Faced with this history, even the most relentless free-market advocates 
generally admit an important regulatory and supervisory role for 
government in the financial sector. In the United States, this role dates 
back 135 years, to the middle of the Civil War. As it became apparent 
that the Union would be preserved, it also became apparent that a 
national banking system would greatly enhance recovery and growth in 
the postbellum period, and an effective national banking system required 
effective regulation. But this recognition of the importance of regulation 
has often been overshadowed by fervor for liberalization and 
deregulation. To be sure, the advocates of liberalization and 
deregulation seldom go so far as to advocate free banking; but by failing 
to understand the roles and functions of financial market regulation-and 
constraints under which it operates—they have left the financial sector in 
many countries far weaker. Indeed, there is evidence that financial 
market deregulation is systematically related to an increased likelihood 
of a financial crisis. Thus badly designed reforms of financial regulation 
have contributed to the “boom in busts,”19 20to use the memorable phrase 
of my colleague Jerry Caprio, which the world has experienced in the 
last quarter-century.
Government regulation of the financial sector is desirable for reasons 
that have been extensively discussed elsewhere: the public-good aspects 
of monitoring, the systemic consequences of crises, the tendency of 
governments to respond with bailouts as a result of these systemic 
worries (the “too-big-to-fail” doctrine) -  all arguments which have their 
counterpart in the debate over international financial flows. Today, 
there is a consensus that there is a role for government regulation. To 
be sure, there are some regulations which no longer serve any useful 
purpose, and these should be eliminated. My target here is a narrower 
one: the intellectual incoherence and incompleteness of the approach that 
some have advocated under the rubric of financial-market liberalization. 
I am taking issue with the doctrine, often associated with financial 
market liberalization, that says that the best way of providing for 
prudential regulation is ensuring that there are strong, risk-adjusted,
19 Caprio (1997, p. 80). Caprio and Klingenbiel (1996) identify banking crises, 
defined as episodes when the entire banking system has zero or negative net worth, 
in 69 countries since the late 1970s. In addition, this data only identifies countries 
with sufficient data. They estimate that inclusion of the transition economies would 
add crises in at least 20 more countries.




























































































capital- adequacy standards. These doctrines argue against restrictions 
on lending practices (other than self-dealing) and other interventions, 
such as deposit-rate ceilings and entry barriers. But neither theory nor 
evidence supports this position. A recent paper that I wrote with my 
colleagues at Stanford, Kevin Murdock and Thomas Heilman, showed 
that the sole reliance on capital adequacy standards is inefficient, and 
that there can be Pareto improvements from employing a wider range 
of instruments. Worse still, in some cases, increasing capital adequacy 
standards can lead to less prudential behavior, as such increases have an 
adverse effect on franchise value; and it is franchise value plus capital 
that determines a bank’s lending behavior. Both theory and evidence 
supports the view that restrictions can both strengthen the financial 
system and contribute to (or at least not adversely affect) economic 
growth.21 And economic analysts and practitioners alike now recognize 
that the risk adjustments associated with capital-adequacy standards are 
inadequate. In fact, they may even have contributed to the crises, both 
by giving regulators and investors a false sense of confidence in the 
strength of financial institutions (which in some cases had exceeded the 
Basle standards) and by providing perverse incentives.22
One might ask what could lead to the pursuit of such simplistic 
approaches to financial sector regulation -  other than a simple lack of 
understanding of capital markets. One interpretation is that this 
approach marks a rear-guard attempt to minimize the role of 
government: having recognized the need for some role for government, 
free market ideologues have asked, what is the minimal role, not what is 
the most effective way of attaining the objectives?
This discussion of the intellectual inconsistencies that have weakened so 
many of the recent discussions of the new international architecture 
suggests that ideologies -  and possibly special interests -  may have been 
playing a larger role than economic science, than analyses based on 
coherent models and empirical evidence. In the following sections, I will 
focus on three key policy issues concerning the new international 
architecture: interventions in short term capital flows, the lender-of- 
last-resort role, and international bankruptcy provisions. But first, I 
want to illustrate how all of these intellectual confusions play out in 
recent discussions of contagion.






























































































The most serious argument underlying bailouts is that without them, 
crisis would lead to contagion. As I have already noted, contagion is 
evidence of a market failure -  specifically, an externality. As in the case 
of any other externality, such as air or water pollution, there is a 
presumption that government should act to mitigate the externality. And 
even if there were no contagion, the fact that governments do intervene 
on the grounds that they fear contagion (or even use it as an excuse for 
providing corporate welfare for lenders, as some have suggested) itself 
helps explain why there is a discrepancy between private and social risk­
bearing. The argument that there is no moral hazard because lenders do 
bear some costs is simply wrong: moral hazard exists whenever lenders 
do not bear the full costs of their actions, which they do not so long as 
there is a bailout.
But I want to go further here: to show how the presence of contagion 
itself suggests that there are further market failures in the economy. 
Contagion operates through trade and capital markets. On the trade side, 
the loss of markets in the affected countries has adverse effects on its 
trading partners. Note that this argument reflects an assumption of 
imperfect markets; for the loss of sales to Thailand, say, represents a 
minuscule effect on world trade, and with perfect markets, there would 
be no perceptible effect on world prices or on the sales of any firm. In 
practice, this is not true, and in fact, in the recent experience, the direct 
trade effect has been amplified by a terms-of-trade effect: commodity 
prices and prices of goods supplied by the affected countries have 
plummeted.
The capital market effects are even harder to reconcile with perfect 
markets. Why should a crisis in East Asia roil capital flows to Brazil? 
Or a crisis in Moscow affect Buenos Aires? There are two mechanisms. 
The first is that these crises affect beliefs. The question is, what 
information does a crisis in Thailand convey about the Brazilian 
economy? None. But consider what happens if there are pervasive 
irrationalities in the market, either of the kind described above, or by 
Keynes, who described capital markets using the non-politically correct 
metaphor of a beauty contest. In this metaphor, judges are not trying to 
pick the most beautiful contestant, but the one who others believe is the 
most beautiful. If the beauty-contest metaphor holds, then there may be 
“rationality” in seemingly irrational responses: if each investor believes 
that the crisis in Thailand will discourage others from investing in 
emerging markets, then it is individually rational for all investors to 
pull out of those markets. In this way, the crisis in Thailand precipitated




























































































a run on other emerging markets, just as a run on the banking system 
can be precipitated by a myriad of events. These triggers serve as 
“coordinating mechanisms”; once a particular variable is indeed acting 
as a coordinating mechanism, it pays each investor to heed that variable, 
even if it has no intrinsic value. But due to such sunspot equilibria, the 
market may not be Pareto-efficient: some equilibria may Pareto- 
dominate others, and there may exist interventions that improve each of 
the equilibria.23
Once one admits the possibility of these sunspot equilibria, of course, 
almost anything is possible: variables that are intrinsically unrelated to 
the economy can have real effects. An economic crisis in Mexico could 
plummet the Argentine economy from one equilibria to another, while a 
bailout that resolves the Mexican crisis could move the Argentinean 
economy back to its original equilibrium. Thus, a bailout could serve to 
contain the contagion. In such situations, economists are forced into the 
never-never land of trying to predict investor reactions, a land in which 
those reactions may be consistent with each other but are only loosely 
related to structural properties of the economy. That is, there may be no 
reason for the collapse of the Mexican economy to affect Argentina 
adversely, other than it is used as a coordinating mechanism in a sunspot 
equilibrium. To be sure, if a particular pattern of sunspots frequently 
led to a movement from one equilibrium to another, then the empirical 
evidence for such a sunspot equilibrium would be overwhelming, and 
our task as economists would be relatively easy. But in most cases where 
there is an assertion of such seemingly irrational patterns, the historical 
record is thin; we can only hope that crises will remain sufficiently rare 
that this remains true.24
If one applies the logic of rational expectations to contagion, the success 
of a bailout is far more questionable.25 For assume that a market 
participant believes that he is less well informed about the Mexican 
crisis than are the US government officials engineering the politically
23 In general, Nash equilibria are Pareto-efficient only under the highly restrictive 
conditions associated with the Arrow-Debreu model. For early models of multiple 
equilibria (including sunspot equilibria), see Stiglitz (1972) and Shell (1977).
24 The ability of a temporary increase in interest rates to sustain a “good” equilibrium, 
even after the monetary tightening has been eliminated, may be attributed to such 
sunspot equilibria. (The alternative explanation, that it serves as a signaling device, 
has been discredited, at least in the context of the East Asia crisis.) See Stiglitz 
(1997) and Furman and Stiglitz (1998). The historical record on the relationship 
between interest rate changes and exchange rate changes provides scant evidence in 
support for there being a systematic relationship. See Kraay (1998) and Stiglitz and 
Furman (1998).




























































































costly bailout. Then he might well infer that the Mexican crisis is fairly 
deep, requiring a bailout to sustain the economy at even the low level to 
which it will likely sink. But then imagine the investor turns his 
attention to Argentina. He might well reason that the United States has 
less of a vested interest in Argentina than in Mexico, and that therefore, 
given the political difficulty of engineering the Mexican bailout, the 
United States is unlikely to intervene to help Argentina. If there are 
similarities between Mexico and Argentina -  and the investor must be 
hypothesizing such similarities for there to be contagion -  then he 
concludes from the Mexican bailout that Argentina’s situation is worse. 
Why? Because he believes that a bailout is necessary, but is unlikely for 
political reasons. In this way, a Mexican bailout may deepen Argentina’s 
difficulties.
In this particular example, the so-called Tequila Crisis, matters did not 
unfold as I have described. But my point in relating this story is two­
fold: not only to emphasize how shaky is the ground upon which we 
stand as we pursue the logic of contagion, but also to demonstrate that 
contagion rests on collectively irrational behavior that should limit our 
confidence in the market itself.
Contagion in capital markets could operate through a third channel, as 
some have argued it did this year. Imperfections in capital markets mean 
that losses in the Russian market precipitate margin calls and a portfolio 
rebalancing by investors, which affects other emerging markets. In our 
models of perfect capital markets, this explanation has little persuasive 
power: with thoroughly diversified portfolios, the losses in Russia 
represented such a small fraction of the world’s wealth that portfolio 
rebalancing should have negligible effects on Latin America, rather than 
the dramatic effects it apparently had in practice.26
It was not only the existence of contagion, but also the responses to it, 
that illustrated market failures and irrationalities. Note that contagion 
exacts its greatest costs through the economic collapses that it sets off. If 
markets worked perfectly and adjustments were instantaneous, the 
economy would respond quickly to these disturbances and full
26 The Russian debacle is argued by some to have had such an adverse effect on other 
emerging markets because it served to remind investors of the possibility of a 
unilateral abrogation of a debt contract. But surely, this was not news. Such 
unilateral abrogations had occurred in the past, and what should have been 
interpreted as essentially equivalent events had already occurred in East Asia: 
Korea’s “voluntary” rescheduling earlier in the year (where it was perfectly clear that 
had lenders not submitted to the voluntary rescheduling, it would have occurred in 
any case) and Indonesia’s formal recognition of what was already the de facto 




























































































employment and growth would quickly be restored. And although the 
disturbances might indeed lead to wealth redistributions, they would not 
hamper the efficiency of the economy. Indeed, that is the major thrust 
of the vast literature in the United States that goes by the label of “real 
business cycles”, a literature that takes seriously the contention that 
markets are efficient. To economists of this persuasion, economic 
fluctuations are just the economy’s efficient adaptation to changes 
(“shocks,” in the technical jargon) in technology and preferences (and 
presumably, in modern extensions, also new information). In this view, 
the low employment during the Great Depression simply reflected 
individual choice: under the new parameters characterizing the economy 
in the late 1920s and early 1930s, individuals preferred to enjoy more 
leisure than they had before. This analysis is indeed the logical (and 
intellectually coherent) consequence of die belief in efficient markets. 
But to most economists, especially outside of a few American academic 
establishments, and to virtually all non-economists, such analyses seem 
ludicrous. The reason that contagion is of concern is that markets do not 
adjust well, and that the shock waves triggered by contagion can have 
real adverse consequences that domestic macro-policy cannot quickly 
and fully offset. Ironically, there is a growing consensus that many of 
the policy prescriptions designed to stem contagion in the current crisis 
involved macro-adjustments that exacerbated rather than dampened 
market imperfections, and thereby deepened the economic downturns in 
the affected countries.
Market Failures: A Recap
This discussion of the intellectual inconsistencies prevalent in many 
discussions of the architecture of international capital markets, and 
illustrated by the interpretations of contagion, has also served to identify 
most of the relevant market failures which will underpin our policy 
discussion below:
• Contagion and systemic consequences of financial market 
disturbances imply that there are significant externalities.
• Markets are rife with information imperfections. Actions within the 
market affect beliefs;27 prices do not convey all of the relevant 
information; aggregate information that is relevant for decision­
making is not only not provided automatically by the market, but 
may require government enforced disclosure requirements; and 
information imperfections lead to market imperfections, especially in 
capital markets. These information imperfections lead to a variety of




























































































apparent irrationalities in market behavior and performance, 
including excess volatility, and are associated with the possibility of 
inefficient sunspot equilibria.
• There are missing markets in futures and risk-sharing instruments. 
Firms cannot insure themselves against fluctuations in exchange rates 
in the more distant future, and households cannot insure themselves 
in the market against the risks associated with macro-economic 
fluctuations, including those induced by contagion.28
• Public good issues arise in the provision of information and actions 
to stabilize the economy. Indeed, there is a growing recognition of 
the importance of international public goods,2 including the 
provision of international economic stability and of certain types of 
information.
• Imperfect competition in goods markets means that disturbances in 
one country can have disproportionately large effects on its 
neighbors. Other aspects of imperfect competition help explain why 
bank failures have systemic effects, why governments engage in 
bailouts (justified by the too-big-to-fail doctrine), and why futures 
markets for some important policy risks are missing.30
Capital Market Liberalization
Let me first dispense with two issues on which I think there is 
consensus: capital markets are important and indeed are central to the 
success of a market economy, but capital markets differ from other 
markets in essential ways.31 There is also a consensus (to which I 
referred in the beginning of my talk) that capital market liberalization 
leads to increased risk; the crisis in East Asia is only the most recent 
example of a phenomenon that had already been widely documented. 
Liberalization is systematically associated with an increased probability 
of a financial sector crisis,32 and such crises are systematically associated
28 The importance of the absence of risk markets cannot be overemphasized. In 
Newbery and Stiglitz (1982), we show that opening trade may lead to a Pareto- 
inferior equilibria in the absence of risk markets.
25 For a discussion of the concept of global or international public goods, see Stiglitz 
(1995) and Council of Economic Advisers (1997).
30 For instance, in the United States grain markets, four or five firms have a dominant 
role; their informational advantages lead to thin futures markets. See Kyle (1992).
31 In particular, capital markets produce information but at the same time are plagued 
with problems of imperfections of information. The central theorems of welfare 
economics assume that information is perfect, or at least not affected by actions of 
the agents within the economy—thus making those theorems completely irrelevant to 
understanding how financial markets operate.
32 See Kaminksy and Reinhardt (1998). Kaminsky and Reinhardt point out that “in 18 




























































































with a slowdown in economic growth over the five succeeding years.”  I 
want to discuss here three more difficult questions: (a) Have the benefits 
been commensurate with the risks, and if not, why not? (b) Are there 
ways to mitigate the risks, and hence increase the net benefits? (c) Are 
policy interventions desirable? If so, what should the objectives of such 
interventions be, and how should we assess success?
Why do the benefits of liberalization appear to be so limited?
Several studies have suggested that the net benefits of capital market 
liberalization -  in terms of either growth or investment -  are limited at 
best.3 4 (See Figures 2 and 3.)35 In a sense, this result should come as no 
surprise. Capital market liberalization has focused on opening capital 
markets to short-term flows. Foreign direct investment is widely 
recognized to have large benefits: it brings with it not only capital, but 
more importantly access to markets, new technologies, and human 
capital. Short-term capital that is necessary for trade is also vital, and 
even before capital account liberalization, governments and international 
actors made great efforts to ensure that firms had access to trade 
finance.
Why might the net benefits of capital-market liberalization have been so 
low? Recall that even before liberalization, the countries of East Asia 
were already saving at a very high rate (See Figure 4).36 Even with the 
Philippines included, the average saving rate for the East Asia 5 
exceeded 30 percent, or 33 percent when FDI is included. Together, 
domestic savings and FDI would have financed a very robust 
investment/GDP ratio. Questions could legitimately be raised: what 
value was there in greater capital flows? Surely, at some point the 
marginal return to investment declines; should we be surprised, then, 
that capital-account liberalization was associated with low returns? In 
retrospect, it is clear that the countries that liberalized made a bad 
bargain.
the preceding five years, usually less.” See also Demirgu?-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998b). Dcmirgu5-Kunt and Detragiache found systematic cross-country evidence 
that financial liberalization, measured by the relaxation of controls on interest rates, 
increases the probability of a banking crisis.
33 See Caprio (1996) and Figure 1.
34 See Rodrik (1998) and International Monetary Fund (1995). There are however, 
some economic papers which claim the contrary, namely that capital account 
liberalization is correlated with economic growth. See Quinn (1997).
35 See Figures 2 and 3.




























































































To see just how bad, let me run through a few back-of-the-envelope 
calculations. Assume that these countries had borrowed short-term at 8 
percent real, and managed to earn even a 10 percent real return, for a 
net return of 2 percent. Assume further that they had managed to get an 
inflow of capital equal to 10 percent of their GDP. Short-term capital 
inflows then would have generated a net gain of 0.2 percent of GDP per 
year. Assume that the flows kept pace with the growth of their 
economy, that their economies would have grown at 6 percent, and that 
they had been able to sustain the given level of returns. Then, using the 
8 percent real interest rate as the discount factor, the present discounted 
value of the gain from capital account liberalization would have 
amounted to 10 percent of current GDP. But now consider the loss from 
the crisis. Assume that they would have been able to maintain, on the 
basis of their own savings, the growth rate of 6 percent.37 Then, if the 
loss in GDP, relative to trend, was just equal to the average experienced 
by developing countries experiencing a banking cum currency crisis, the 
total loss would have amounted to more than 17 percent of current 
GDP. But there is reason to believe that the current crisis is worse than 
average, so that the loss relative is likely to be far greater. Indeed, 
current projections suggest a cumulative fall during 1997, 1998, and 
1999 for, say, Thailand, of approximately 24 percent. If after growth 
recovers there is no “catch-up”38, then the present discounted value of 
losses would equal approximately 12 times GDP, for a cost-benefit ratio 
of 120. No wonder citizens in some developing countries express 
skepticism about the virtues of capital-account liberalization!
There is another reason that the benefits may be limited. Recent studies39 
show that a key variable predicting crises seems to be the ratio of short­
term debt to reserves. There is some controversy about why that should 
be so40, but for the purpose of our current discussion, what matters is 
the market’s beliefs about what constitutes prudent behavior. And if the 
market “insists” that an increase in short-term foreign-denominated debt 
be matched by an increase in short-term foreign denominated liabilities, 
just think what that implies. A firm in some poor African country 
manages to borrow $100 million at 18 or 20 percent -  perhaps from a 
sound American bank, or perhaps from a bank that knows that because
37 The steady inflows would have enabled them to maintain a higher level of GDP, but 
not in general a higher growth rate.
38 Consistent with models suggesting a unit root.
39 See, for example, Furman and Stiglitz (1998).
40 In principle, all money in the country could be converted into foreign currency, and 
thus be subject to capital flight; for this reason, earlier studies focused not on short­
term liabilities but on the ratios of M2 to reserves. Nevertheless, in the East Asian 
crises, this variable did far more poorly as a predictor of crisis than did the ratio of 




























































































it has uncovered hedges that the regulators have yet to discover that it is 
on the verge of collapse and is therefore willing to undertake a big 
gamble in return for high returns41. Then to be prudent, the poor 
developing country must put aside $100 million in reserves, typically in 
the form of U.S. Treasury bonds. What is the net result? In effect, the 
country is borrowing at 18 percent and lending at 4 percent -  a deal that 
may well look good from the point of the United States (which has taken 
the lead in pushing for capital market liberalization), but that hardly 
seems a path to growth for the African country. Indeed, the sacrifices 
that the country has to make -  in terms of forgone investments in 
education or health or public infrastructure -  may well be a drag on its 
growth.
How have other policy measures contributed to risk, 
and how can we mitigate the risk?
Sadly, in spite of the potential for risk reduction that seems to be 
offered by diversification in the international capital markets, risk has 
increased. A full understanding of why this might be so would take us 
beyond the scope of this lecture, but let me outline some of the elements 
of the answer.
The first is that even in capital markets that have long been open, such 
as that of the United States, there is much less diversification than one 
might have thought.42 And part of the explanation for this is simply lack 
of information: individuals do know more about their own country than 
about what is going on abroad, and hence the perceived and actual risk 
of investing abroad is greater. Much of the return to investing are 
private not social returns, so that it is important to find out slightly 
before other investors about a change in circumstances that increases or 
decreases the market value of an asset.43 Those inside the country are 
more likely to know about adverse changes in their circumstances 
before those outside, and with open capital markets, they can easily get 
their money out. Indeed, the evidence suggests that capital flight from
41 A form of Gresham’s Law operates in the banking world: not only can bad banks 
outbid good banks (when there is deposit insurance but no deposit-rate controls), 
but they also have strong incentives to make bad loans that even reasonably prudent 
borrowers may find hard to resist. See Stiglitz (1992). Contagion thus spreads not 
only from disturbances in one market to other markets, but also from bad banks in 
one market to other markets. Using this reasoning, some of the problems in East 
Asia are arguably attributable to contagion from weak banks in Japan.
42 In the United States, for example, domestic equities made up 96% of total equity 
holdings as recently as 1989 (French and Poterba, 1991). See also Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1996, 304-306)




























































































those inside the country precedes capital withdrawals from outside, and 
is often the root case of a crisis. Knowing this, outsiders should be 
reluctant to enter unless the differential in expected returns is 
sufficiently high; but with a high difference in expected returns, insiders 
will have limited incentive to diversify out, since from their perspective, 
these outside opportunities then yield both lower expected returns and 
higher risk.
Secondly, and in the same vein, imagine that outside investors are 
relatively ill-informed, and thus have relatively flat priors and view 
different small countries as near-perfect substitutes. Then slight changes 
in information may lead to changes in portfolio positions that, from the 
perspective of the small developing country, are quite large. The paucity 
of information thus exposes them to enormous risk.
These tendencies, which may be viewed as “rational behavior in the 
presence of limited and asymmetric information” are exacerbated by the 
well-documented tendencies for herd behavior and the other market 
imperfections to which I referred earlier, which seem to have played at 
least some role in the most recent crisis. Institutional weaknesses -  the 
fragility of financial institutions -  too clearly have played a role.44 
These weaknesses have been one of the foci of Western criticisms of the 
East Asian countries, but several caveats are in order. The first concerns 
what, in the American idiom, we refer to as “the pot calling the kettle 
black.” It is extraordinarily difficult to create strong financial 
institutions. The United States may be justly proud that it is almost a 
decade since its last financial debacle, but other advanced countries, with 
supposed sophisticated regulatory and institutional structures, have had 
their full share of crises more recently; prime examples include 
Norway, Finland, and Sweden. And the very recent bailout of Long 
Term Capital Management, the US-based hedge fund, has made clear 
that what distinguishes the more advanced countries from the less may 
be not only their bank supervision -  evidently even developed-country 
banks have engaged in highly risky speculative ventures -  but also their 
ability to exercise clout upon the private sector, and the private sectors’ 
ability and willingness to respond.45
Although it is weak financial institutions that have been at the center of 
discussions of vulnerability, there is also another sense in which less
44 Demirguf-Kunt and Detriagache (1998a).
45 Indeed, as we have already noted, it was Western and Japanese banks that made the 
marginal loans to Korea, at a time when it was perfecdy known that their companies 





























































































developed countries -  including many in East Asia -  are less able to 
absorb shocks than (say) more developed countries. They typically lack 
the automatic stabilizers that are provided by social safety nets in more 
developed countries, and which serve as effective mechanisms for risk 
absorption.
More broadly, I like to think of an economy as consisting of shock 
absorbers and shock amplifiers46. Economies are constantly buffeted by 
disturbances, and both the price system and risk distribution mechanisms 
play roles in absorbing and distributing risks. During the Great 
Depression, it became widely recognized that the market’s provision of 
these risk absorption/distribution mechanisms was deficient in a number 
of ways: not only was its restorative capacity limited47 and its ability to 
withstand large shocks limited, but the structure of the economy actually 
served to amplify shocks beyond a certain level. For instance, we know 
that the poor, on average, are credit-constrained, and that they typically 
bear disproportionately the burden of decreases in the demand for labor 
hours. Accordingly, we know that the multiplier associated with 
negative shocks to the economy is larger than it would be if wealth were 
more evenly distributed, if capital markets worked more perfectly, and 
if the employment costs of negative shocks were shared more 
equitably.48
In some countries, the amplifiers are stronger than others. For example, 
in a country whose firms have high-debt equity ratios, a slight loss in 
equity resulting from an increase in interest rates or a negative shock to 
demand may (unless there are offsetting risk absorption mechanisms, 
perhaps provided by government49 50) have large macro-economic effects. 
These effects stem from the shift in supply curves (“the supply shock”) 
induced by these changes, which could be quite large. (By contrast, in 
the standard neo-classical model, changes in relative prices typically 
have no aggregate effect; the gains to suppliers precisely offset the losses 
to demanders. °) In countries where credit constraints are more binding,
46 See, for instance, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993).
47 Defenders of the classical model argued, for instance, that the real balance effect 
would eventually restore the economy to full employment If prices continued to 
drop at 10 percent per year, if the ratio of “outside money” to overall wealth 
averaged even as high as 0.3, and if the coefficient on wealth in the consumption 
function was .06, then to restore the economy from a drop of aggregate demand of 
25 percent through the real balance effect alone would have taken decades.
48 See Furman and Stiglitz (1998).
49 As was often the case in some of these countries.
50 The evidence on the importance of this effect is now overwhelming. The 1973 and 





























































































a decrease in cash flow can have larger macro-economic effects than if 
firms can borrow to offset the shortage of cash flow.51
Capital (and financial) market liberalization alters the structure of the 
economy. It exposes it to greater risks, and may in fact lead to 
structures that in fact amplify risks. At the same time, the liberalization 
itself does nothing to strengthen the economy’s ability to buffer itself 
against such risks. Balanced development (like the balanced growth that 
Rosenstein, Rodan and other development economists emphasized in 
earlier decades) requires both an increase in risk exposure and a 
concomitant increase in risk-absorption capacity. Unfortunately, the 
Washington consensus has emphasized the one but paid little attention to 
the other. As Heilman, Murdock, and Stiglitz have emphasized,52 the 
liberalization process touched off a dynamic that weakened absorption 
capacity in two ways. First, it raised the bar for regulatory authorities, 
demanding greater competence to identify and mitigate the many risks 
that banks could now take. But at the same time, it reduced regulators’ 
ability to fulfill even their earlier mandate, since budget stringency 
combined with soaring private-sector salaries enabled the private sector 
to lure away the most competent regulatory staff. The consequences of 
these failures were foreseeable even at the time; they are now, 
unfortunately, becoming all too apparent.
While the structure of the economy affects both whether shocks are 
amplified and whether it can absorb those shocks, inappropriately 
designed responses to crises have also contributed to the magnitude of 
the risks. Here, there is a certain irony. Wealthy countries with a strong 
ability to absorb risk have relied on their own resources; when faced 
with a financial crisis, they have carefully taken into account the ability 
of their citizens to absorb risks; they have engaged in forbearance, even 
if at the same time they have increased regulatory oversight.53 By 
contrast, small countries that have had to turn to outsiders for assistance 
have not always benefited from the same balance of wisdom versus 
dogma, of political insight versus moral rectitude. Those with a seat at 
the table have not always been representative of all stakeholders: 
investors’ views may have had far more influence than those of the 
workers and small businesses affected by the so-called rescue package.
51 Matters are more complicated than this simplistic discussion would suggest: if firms 
know that they do not have access to credit, or will not have access to credit in the 
event of a downturn, then they will build up a buffer, which will serve them as a 
shield against at least moderate shocks. By the same token, if credit is more easily 
available, firms may take greater risks, in the expectation that they can call upon this 
supply of capital if need be.
52 See Heilman, Murdock, and Stiglitz (1997).




























































































Figure 1: GDP Growth, Pre and Post Bank Insolvency, 1974-1994
Region Five Years Mean GDP Fiv Years
before crisis Growth after crisis










* A t-test(significant at p<0.05) indicates that the pre-and post-crisis 
means differ.
** Since there was no crisis in these countries, the sample was split in 
half, i.e., 1980-87 for the first observation and 1988-94 for the sec­
ond. Although it should not be necessary, a t-test indicates that there 





























































































Figure 2: Capital Controls and Growth: 1985-1996
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Figure 4: East Asia 5 Savings as % of GDP
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The high interest rates and fiscal contractions often associated with the 
crisis precipitated by the capital volatility have, without question, led to 
economic downturns, a rise in unemployment, widespread bankruptcy, 
and social and political disruption. Clearly, we lack good 
counterfactuals, and it is theoretically possible that matters might have 
turned out as badly or worse in the absence of these “rescue” policies. 
But a growing and well-founded consensus holds that the crisis 
responses have themselves increased the crisis countries’ real risks, and 
added to their variability in output and employment, even though the 
responses may have helped stabilize exchange rates and served to protect 
investor capital.
I believe that it is possible to mitigate risks, through appropriate actions 
both before and after a crisis occurs. Elsewhere, 1 have spelled out a set 
of policies that I call “socially just responses to economic crises.”54 
These policies, and the processes by which they are arrived at, are in 
many ways markedly different from the approach taken by the 
international community in recent years. Most importantly, the new 
international architecture must be designed so that all those who are 
affected -  including the workers and smaller investors, and not just 
international investors -  can make their voices heard, and heard clearly, 
at the tables where the responses to crises are forged. The framework 
that has so often prevailed in recent years -  where not only do these 
groups not have a seat at the table, but the terms of the agreement are 
not even made public as a matter of course -  undermines the democratic 
principles that we all theoretically share. The time has come to end this 
hypocrisy: either we believe that economic policy, a central function of 
public policy, should be part of democratic processes or we do not. I, 
for one, believe that there are few values so central, and so essential to 
maintaining the civil liberties without which the nightmares of the past 
may be revisited upon us in the future, than democratic accountability, 
openness, and transparency in public policy.
And I also believe that without such openness and accountability, it is 
likely that we will see more policy responses like those of the past -  
responses that have led not only to deep recession, but to outright 
depression, to social and political unrest, to stagnation. It has become 
fashionable among economists to analyze the political economy of rent- 
seeking, to provide insights into why governments so often fail to live 
up to their potential and promise. But political economy considerations 
apply equally to the international agencies and to the outside pressures 
that affect crisis resolution and government policy reform. They are as




























































































present in the governments of more developed countries as they are in 
less developed countries, and they are reflected in both the advice that is 
given and the receptiveness to that advice. As social scientists, we need 
to rise above these parochial interests, to reflect the broader interests of 
those both in the less and more developed countries. Otherwise, these 
voices that may not be heard, perhaps because they lack a seat at the 
relevant tables, or perhaps because they lack the cleverness to express 
their views in ways that effectively counter well-organized lobbies.
Are New Policy Interventions Desirable?
I come at last to the main point of this talk: elements of the new 
economic architecture. Let us briefly review where we have been.
• There are extensive market failures in capital markets, 
resulting in significant discrepancies between private and social 
returns to risks.
• Institutions, especially within less developed countries, suffer 
from limitations that reduce their ability -  and especially the 
ability of the poorer members to society -  to bear risks.
• Capital (and financial) market liberalization significantly 
increases the risks facing less developed countries, increases 
the demands on the regulatory authority, and at the same time, 
may inhibit their ability to respond to these greater challenges.
But what are national governments, and the international community, to 
do in response? There are four sets of issues that I want to address in 
my remaining time.
• What is the role of increased surveillance, improved 
monitoring, and enhancing transparency?
• What can be done to reduce exposure to short-term foreign- 
exchange denominated risk?
• What is the role of a new international architecture for work­
outs, and what should such a set of arrangements look like?
• What is the potential role of a lender of last resort?
Transparency
I have dealt with the first question extensively elsewhere. Transparency 
is important, particularly in an open and democratic society. And in 
general, improved information increases the efficiency of capital 




























































































of the declines, as lenders, faced with lack of information, decided to 
withdraw funds from all borrowers.
But we should be clear: lack of transparency is not the cause of the 
current crisis, nor will improved transparency eliminate crises. The fact 
of the matter is, most of the relevant information was available when 
lenders made their decisions to make their risky loans. The lenders to 
the Korean firms knew not only about those firms’ debt-equity ratios, 
but also about the relationship between government and firms. Those 
who participated in the Thai capital market knew, or should have 
known, about its capital-account deficits.
Interestingly, as the contagion has spread from East Asia to Latin 
America, fewer commentators have continued to single out transparency 
as the cause of an economy’s suffering a crisis. And surely lack of 
transparency does not explain the withdrawal of credit from the strong 
Latin American performers: presumably there was plenty of evidence 
suggesting that these countries were in quite different circumstances 
than was Russia. Nor, for that matter, was transparency ever 
emphasized in explanations of crises before 1997. Instead, it seems to 
have been an ad hoc variable introduced to explain the crises in the 
countries of East Asia.
Yet if transparency makes a country more vulnerable to economic 
crises, why was it that the countries of East Asia had actually 
experienced greater economic stability than countries elsewhere in the 
world over the past three decades? Perhaps because these countries had 
become less transparent? On the contrary, the evidence suggests that if 
anything, these countries had become more transparent during the 
1990s!
Furthermore, if transparency makes a country more vulnerable to 
economic crises, the presumption should be that the East Asian countries 
are significantly less transparent than average. On the contrary, at least 
some of the affected countries are more transparent than countries on 
average.55 And it is worth noting that the last major set of financial 
crises in the world occurred in Scandinavia, in countries generally 
credited with having highly transparent governments.




























































































As a theoretical matter, increased information can lead to either more 
or less economic volatility.56 Indeed, one of the reasons that bank 
regulators have been reluctant to endorse greater transparency (aside 
from the fact the more transparency means less discretionary authority 
for regulators) is their worry that more transparency would have turned 
a minor problem into a full-scale crisis. Had there been greater 
transparency in the United States during the 1980s, it is arguably the 
case that many banks -  in addition to the S & L’s -  would have gone 
under. Certainly, the financial crisis would have occurred earlier.
Yes, greater transparency is desirable, and it may even improve matters 
(though even this is not certain). But it is embarrassing that while lack 
of transparency was not viewed as the cause of the Mexican crisis 
(ironically, while low savings was identified as one of the causes of that 
crisis, the countries next afflicted were the countries with the highest 
savings rate: so much for the accepted wisdom of the day!), it did 
become the focus of the international community’s attention in the 
aftermath of the Mexico crisis -  and yet it is now blamed for that crisis: 
so much for the efficacy of the response! And it is pollyannaish to think 
that future responses will be that much more effective.
Still, as I have said, increased transparency — both of corporations, 
financial institutions, and governments -  would be a positive step. And 
as the recent report of the G-22 emphasizes, we need not only 
transparency, we need transparency in the monitoring of transparency.
Reducing short-term liabilities
The second question I posed above was how to reduce short-term 
liabilities denominated in foreign exchange. As I noted earlier, the 
variable most closely associated with the recent crises is the ratio of 
short-term foreign-denominated liabilities to reserves. When that ratio 
exceeds unity, the country is viewed to be highly vulnerable. We should 
be clear: from a theoretical perspective, it is hard to justify this 
variable.57 But since the data is speaking with some clarity, we must take 
up the issue of how to control these liabilities. There are at least four 
ways of doing so, some more useful than others:
36 The basic insight is provided by Stiglitz (1975): improved information leads to the 
differentiation of situations which otherwise would be treated the same. For a more 
general discussion, see Stiglitz and Furman (1998).
37 Though if there are sunspot equilibria, the ratio of short-term foreign-denominated 
liabilities to reserves may serve as the coordinating mechanism for switching from 





























































































• Reducing distortions that encourage such exposures
• Improving prudential bank regulations
• Dampening short term capital flows more broadly
Improving information: The argument for improved information is 
simple: if only lenders knew the magnitude of aggregate exposure, they 
would not have been willing to lend as much.58 But little evidence 
supports the conclusion that information by itself would go far to 
remedy the problem. Much information about the extent of exposure 
was available to investors, had they thought such information to be 
worth collecting. They had data on balance of payments and exchange 
rates. There was even data on vacancy rates in commercial office 
buildings in Thailand, where so much of the money was going, and on 
the debt-equity ratio of firms in Korea, the major source of that 
country’s vulnerability. As I noted earlier, the very emphasis on this 
variable is inconsistent with standard views of how markets work; in 
those mental models, aggregate quantitative information of this kind is 
not viewed as relevant, because prices convey all the information that 
matters. Moreover, gathering this aggregate information has become 
more and more difficult, thanks to the very process of decentralization 
associated with highly competitive markets. Finally, the enormous 
expansion of derivatives raises further questions about the feasibility of 
obtaining the relevant aggregate information.
The one advantage of emphasizing more information is that it probably 
does little harm, may do some good, and has little cost. I say probably 
because those who might be adversely affected by the disclosure of 
information have incentives to change behavior in ways which may 
impose more risk; banks may, for instance, engage in riskier off-balance 
sheet activities. There are a variety of ways by which managers may 
alter the information that is available under virtually any set of 
disclosure rules, with concomitant changes in the true underlying risk 
exposure.59
5! It is worth noting that the call for disclosures of the kind required to provide the 
relevant aggregate data reflects the recognition of a market failure: there is a public- 
goods nature to the information, and private parties may have insufficient incentives 
to disclose the relevant information. When single firms can take positions in the 
market that are large enough to represent a threat to the stability of markets, as the 
Fed argued was the case with LTCM, then if course they may well have incentives 
not to disclose information. Ironically, the bailout of LTCM was not accompanied 
by calls for better financial market regulation on the part of the Fed, and few even 
raised the question of whether a firm that was “too big too fail” violated underlying 
tenets of competition policy.




























































































Reducing distortions: A more promising approach, it seems to me, 
would be to eliminate the tax, regulatory, and policy distortions that 
may, in the past, have stimulated excessive short-term capital flows. 
Examples of such distortions are evident in the case of Thailand, where 
the tax advantages granted to the Bangkok International Banking 
Facilities encouraged short-term external borrowing. Subtle examples 
exist almost everywhere, however, and not just in the crisis countries. 
Without risk-based capital requirements for banks, for instance, 
incentives for holding certain assets and liabilities will be distorted. And 
because even the best of the risk-adjustments are imperfect, there are 
still distortions even in the best of systems.
Improving prudential regulation: Improved prudential regulation could 
also yield major gains, and we should pursue this approach. We should 
acknowledge clearly, however, that this course requires a major step 
back from the type of financial-market liberalization that has 
characterized the misguided reforms over the past two decades. 
Improving financial market regulation will entail both restricting the 
activities in which banks can engage and changing the risk adjustments 
for capital adequacy in ways that will significantly alter both how banks 
raise funds and how they lend. Given the systematic discrepancies 
between social and private returns -  discrepancies that are especially 
important in banking -  I believe these interventions are warranted.
This is not the place to go into a full account of these interventions, but 
let me list a couple:
• There need to be restrictions on the net foreign exchange 
exposure of banks. Borrowing in dollars and lending in baht 
(for example) gives rise to a huge currency risk exposure, 
making the bank highly vulnerable to changes in exchange 
rates. These exposures played an important role in the recent 
crises. Several countries have imposed such restrictions on 
banks, and these restrictions have been effective in reducing 
vulnerability. But foreign exchange exposure comes not only 
directly, but indirectly, through the corporations to which they 
lend. Firms seeking funds from banks must be required to 
disclose their foreign exchange exposure, including derivative 
positions.
• Governments need to impose effecdve and risk-adjusted 
capital-adequacy standards that reflect the real risks facing the 
banks. But this will be difficult. Even banks in the supposedly 
well-regulated advanced countries made loans not just to 




























































































debt-equity ratios. As a practical matter, however, no 
government has imposed good systems of capital adequacy. 
One important lacuna is that although credit risk is typically 
recognized (though gauged imperfectly), market-value risk 
associated with changes in interest rates or risk premia are not. 
Furthermore, regulations do not examine total portfolio risk, 
including the correlations among market risks and between 
market risk and credit risk. Even countries such as the United 
States have deliberately shied away from fully transparent 
risk-adequacy standards based on modern risk analysis. 
Accordingly, it is unreasonable to expect such indirect control 
devices to work very effectively in developing countries. And 
there are even circumstances in which imperfect risk 
adjustments can even lead to increased risk-taking.
• Adjusting deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and 
capital adequacy standards to reflect the riskiness on both the 
asset and liability side of banks’ portfolio. These risks vary 
with time, and so the “penalties” would have to be adjusted 
over time. This would entail imposing higher costs on banks 
which had more short term foreign denominated deposits than 
long term deposits; higher costs on banks that lent to real 
estate, especially as real estate vacancy rates appear to rise; 
higher costs on banks that lend to firms that have high debt 
equity ratios; and higher costs on banks that lend to firms that 
have large unmatched foreign exchange exposure. These 
higher costs would be reflected in higher charges they would 
impose on their customers, thereby discouraging high debt 
equity ratios and foreign exchange exposure on the part of 
banks.
• Regulators should not focus exclusively on capital-adequacy 
standards (even if risk-adjusted). Indeed, as we have noted, 
increasing capital-adequacy standards may actually lead to 
increased risk-taking, since an increase in capital-adequacy 
standards will lead to a decrease in franchise value. Moreover, 
a mechanistic implementation of capital-adequacy standards 
can exacerbate economic fluctuations: a slight downturn 
leading to some non-performing loans that put the bank below 
the capital-adequacy standard forces banks to constrain credit, 
contributing to the economic downturn. Thus a vicious cycle is 
set in motion. Indeed, there is concern that just such a vicious 
cycle has contributed significantly to the current 
recession/depression in East Asia.60




























































































• But there is no reason to believe, as I have said, that bank 
regulators, even in developed countries, but especially in less 
developed countries, will be able to implement a fully effective 
risk management system based on the use of these “price” 
mechanisms. In many situations, direct controls should be 
imposed. Even in advanced countries, this principle is 
recognized: most have outright bans, or limits, on insider 
lending; they do not simply “charge” a price penalty, reflecting 
the higher probability that the loan is a bad loan. Thailand had 
such quantitative restrictions on real estate lending, as we have 
noted: there current travails can be traced to this since 
regulatory lapse perhaps -  which facilitated the real estate 
bubble -  more than to any other single factor.
The fact of the matter is that even developed countries have had only 
limited success in creating strong systems of financial regulation, as 
evidenced not only by the frequent financial crises in those countries, 
but even more recently by the bailout of LTCM in the United States. 
Derivatives have made the challenge of regulating financial markets 
greater; and less developed countries both face greater risks and have 
weaker institutional capacities. (And indeed financial liberalization, 
while it has increased the demands on regulators, has decreased their 
capacity: the private sector has lured away many of the most competent 
government officials.)
This recognition -  that regulating financial institutions is quite difficult 
-  has strong implications. We need to be cautious in exposing these 
inherently frail financial institutions to undue risk, and regulators need 
to embrace a broader range of instruments, beyond simply imposing 
capital-adequacy standards. Many of the so-called reforms undertaken 
under the name of financial market liberalization may have served to 
weaken, rather than strengthen, the financial sector, at least given their 
current stage of development.
Dampening short-term flows at a macro level: The steps that I have 
described so far are important and will make a difference, but my view 
is that they will not go far toward eliminating the problem. My doubts 
stem from two recognitions, both of which I’ve already alluded to: first, 
that even developed countries have had great difficulties in properly 
regulating banks; and second, that financial liberalization typically 
creates a “go-go” atmosphere in which regulatory rectitude is deemed
combined with increased oversight, and perhaps even increased restrictions on the 




























































































passé, and in which the best and brightest desert regulatory agencies for 
well-paid private-sector positions.
Indonesia’s experience demonstrates that solving the banking problem 
may not solve the problem of short-term flows: two-thirds of that 
country’s short-term indebtedness was due to corporates. Indeed, if 
there are underlying economic forces (such as beliefs about returns, 
whether justified or not) that make such short-term foreign borrowing 
desirable, then stopping banks from engaging in this borrowing only 
diverts the flow of funds into other (possibly less efficient) channels. It 
is like putting a finger in a hole in a dike. The pressures will simply 
shift elsewhere; the fact that in most countries the problem today is bank 
borrowing does not really address this issue.61
The systemic risks to which short-term foreign-currency exposure can 
give rise -  the systematic difference between private and social risks -  
provide ample justification for taking further measures. The question is 
only: (i) do effective measures exist that (ii) do not have significant 
adverse side effects? Among the ideas currently under discussion, and 
one that I think deserves serious consideration, are inhibitions on capital 
inflows at the macro level. In thinking about how to accomplish this, we 
should look to the lessons of the Chilean experience. Chile has imposed a 
reserve requirement on all short-term capital inflows -  essentially a tax 
on short-maturity loans. The reserve requirement seems to have been 
effective: it has significantly lengthened the maturity composition of 
capital inflows to Chile without having adverse effects on valuable long­
term capital.62 Chile has recognized that the purpose of the tax is to 
regulate the flows: to dampen an excessive inflow in a period of 
excessive exuberance, and perhaps to encourage inflows when the flow 
is insufficient. Thus, Chile has responded to the current crisis, in which 
short-term flows have dried up, by setting the tax temporarily equal to 
zero.
61 The analysis above suggested an important caveat to this argument. If banks are 
required to assess the risk exposure of the corporates to which they lend, and either 
refuse to lend to corporates with large uncovered foreign exchange exposures or 
charge them a higher interest rate commensurate with their higher risk, then only 
corporates who do not depend on bank lending will have undue exposure. 
Consequently, the failure of these firms will not pose a direct systemic risk to the 
banking system, though if such firms are large in the aggregate, their failure would 
presumably have significant macroeconomic consequences, and thus impose an 
indirect systemic risk.
62 One of the original objectives of Chile’s policy was to provide the government with 
more room for maneuver in setting interest rates. There is some controversy about 




























































































Another instrument that is currently being discussed in countries with a 
corporate income tax is limiting the tax deductibility of foreign 
denominated short-term debt. This policy has some compliance 
advantages: to claim a tax deduction, a corporation would have to 
declare that the debt was not short-term debt denominated in a foreign 
currency. Cheating on this would be subject to penalties for tax fraud. 
And still suffer penalties could be imposed: the government could 
announce that any such debt that was not declared by the borrower 
would automatically be given junior status in a bankruptcy proceeding, 
thus placing on the lender the burden of ensuring that reporting took 
place.
Such a policy could be used as a vehicle for imposing a tax on short­
term foreign denominated capital flows, even if a country did not have a 
corporate income tax.63
Workouts
Let me now turn briefly to the third question that I raised above: how 
should we structure the new international architecture for workouts? A 
keystone in the development of modem capitalism has been limited 
liability and bankruptcy laws. Without limited liability, individuals 
would not be willing to invest equity in corporations, the actions of 
which they could not control and indeed, about which they are typically 
only poorly informed. Modern bankruptcy laws attempt to balance two 
sometimes conflicting considerations: promoting orderly workouts, in 
order to retain business values and minimize production losses; and 
providing appropriate incentives, so that those engaged in risky 
behavior bear the consequences of their actions. Thus, the essential 
ingredients of a bankruptcy law entail a set of rules that specify: (i) 
changes in governance; (ii) changes in claims on assets; and (iii) 
trusteeship. A bankruptcy occurs when the firm cannot satisfy claims on 
it. Trusteeship is necessary because sorting out the claims and
63 Derivatives could be handled in a similar way. Derivative positions would have to be 
reported; a tax could then be imposed on the exposure. Failure to report the 
derivative position would automatically give the derivative an unsecured junior status 
in the event of bankruptcy (the circumstances in which the position would cause the 
most trouble for an economy.) The rebuttal to this argument—that taxing these 
transactions (or disallowing tax deductibility for short-term borrowing denominated 
in foreign exchange) would induce these transactions to move offshore—is of 
limited concern: The companies within the country would, in the event of a crisis, 
have only limited exposure, given the junior standing of the liabilities. And tte 
junior status would itself strongly discourage these transactions. If still stronger 
action were judged desirable, unregistered and untaxed liabilities could be given no 




























































































governance may take time; in the meantime, it is essential that the assets 
not be stripped and not waste away. Under the simplistic model, control 
of assets is assigned to those who can use them most productively, while 
claims are settled in order of priority, with equity owners receiving 
something only if all other claimants have their claims fully satisfied. In 
practice, issues of bargaining, asset specificity (specialized information), 
incentives, and control intrude on the neat settlement of claims: typically 
equity owners do end up with residual value, even though debtors’ 
claims are not fully satisfied. The assets may be most effectively 
administered, at least in the short run, by existing managers (who were 
the former owners), and those managers need to have the kind of 
incentives that equity provides.
In the international context, the flight of capital or withdrawal of short­
term debt does not remove any of the actual factories. The goal is to 
ensure that they continue to produce and that the assets are not stripped.
In the absence of orderly workout procedures, countries may worry that 
unless they issue guarantees or assume private debts, the disruption to 
the economy will be unbearable. International debtors may “blackmail” 
the country into converting the private debt into a public obligation. The 
concerns are particularly acute because courts outside a country may not 
recognize a bankruptcy judgment of another country; thus, while 
Country X’s bankruptcy courts may rule that the claim of a citizen of 
Country Y against its companies has been fully discharged, the courts in 
Country Y may hold otherwise. To be sure, sound drafting of contracts, 
clarifying the laws under which the contract will be interpreted and 
enforced, might mitigate some of these problems, but each country may 
claim to restrict the provisions of contracts that it will recognize. At a 
minimum, there needs to be mutual recognition of the provisions of a 
contract designating that the bankruptcy laws o f a particular country 
will govern in the event of a default.
It might be desirable to go further, to work towards a common standard 
of bankruptcy. But we should recognize that there is no single 
“efficient” bankruptcy standard: there are trade-offs in the design of 
bankruptcy law, and different societies may value those trade-offs 
differently. Bankruptcy law is a political decision, not just a technocratic 
matter.
From the perspective of less developed countries, the absence of an 
adequate bankruptcy law has meant that their citizens have borne an 
undue part of the costs of bad business decisions. What is at stake is not 




























































































incentives to engage in due diligence in making loans. But while the 
international community has long complained about this problem -  the 
problem of moral hazard -  the tendency to bail out lenders at least 
partially is worse today than it was fifteen years ago. True, in many 
cases the bailout has been far from complete and lenders have lost 
money. But to the extent that there is any bailout, lenders have not been 
forced to bear the full risks associated with their investment, and the 
belief that in the future this pattern will continue can give rise to the 
moral hazard. Again, the international community faces a dilemma: it 
often sees no alternative to a bailout, because the risks of not 
undertaking an action -  of contagion as a collapse in one country 
spreads to another -  seem unacceptable. After each crisis, we bemoan 
the extent of the bailout and make resolute speeches pledging that never 
again will lenders be let off the hook to the same extent. And while the 
international community provides funds to the country in the bailout, 
these are loans, not gifts: the money typically goes to investors, and it 
those in the less developed country who end up paying the price.
The international community has established rules of the game that 
disadvantage the less developed country. If a borrowing country 
declares unilaterally a moratorium, it is castigated, threatened with a 
permanent pull-out of capital. It cannot simply declare a “bankruptcy.” 
It thus must enter into negotiations, and while it is in these negotiations, 
capital can continue to leave the country, worsening the position of the 
country. Thus, the cost of delay to the country is greater, and it has an 
incentive thus to come to terms with its lenders quickly -  acquiescing to 
more favorable terms than it might otherwise, including government 
assumption of private obligations.
Recently, the international community has shown a great deal more 
receptivity to the concept of a standstill -  in effect, a temporary 
moratorium while the terms of the work-out are worked out. While 
ultimately the goal of these policies is to create space for the very 
difficult job of a workout in the context of private-to-private capital 
flows with many lenders and borrowers, standstills will have other 
effects: they most likely will shift bargaining power toward 
borrowers.64
64 It is still likely that there will be many instances in which bailouts occur before the 
size of the “haircut” that the private lenders have to take. The sequential nature of the 
decisions itself affects outcomes. (The banks may view themselves as being in a 
different bargaining position after the international community has already committed 
$50 billion to a country, than before.) Securitization, for all of its advantages, may 
make work-outs more difficult. At least in the most recent episodes, however, this 
excuse for not bringing lenders in earlier on has been undermined by the fact that the 




























































































Bankruptcies associated with a financial crisis -  and especially the 
bankruptcies associated with the current crisis in East Asia -  are 
markedly different from typical bankruptcies. When a significant 
fraction of the firms in a country go bankrupt (by one estimate, two- 
thirds of the firms in Indonesia are bankrupt), there is systemic 
bankruptcy. In the case of normal bankruptcy, we infer that there is a 
strong probability that the manager of the bankrupt firm has made a 
mistake, and there is a presumption that the firm needs new 
management. But in the case of systemic bankruptcy, no such inference 
is warranted: not many firms could survive the huge changes in 
exchange rates or the high interest rates that have prevailed in East Asia. 
In the case of systemic bankruptcy, sorting out the value of a firm itself 
is equivalent to solving a set of simultaneous equations, weaving one’s 
way through a tangled web. Each firm has claims on other firms, which 
too are bankrupt, so that it is difficult if not impossible to ascertain the 
value of the firm’s assets. Moreover, with systemic bankruptcies, it is 
difficult to contemplate a change in the management of every enterprise 
(though presumably middle management could be promoted); but if 
ownership of a firm were turned over to its creditors, if they too are 
bankrupt, what does this say about the quality of the new governance? 
Moreover, the transactions costs associated with the ordinary 
bankruptcy procedures are very high; when an entire economy is 
bankrupt, the costs will be unbearable. Moreover, no country has 
enough expertise on hand to handle the caseload.
In all bankruptcies, speed is of the essence, because the assets cannot be 
effectively employed until these issues are resolved. Assets waste away 
as bargaining goes on. Bargaining games often entail high levels of 
inefficiency, as the costs of delay are likely to differ among parties.65 
Because the resolution of these disputes often takes time -  time during 
which assets can be stripped -  effective bankruptcy laws must provide 
for trusteeship in the interim. But in the case of systemic bankruptcies, 
there is an additional cost: the macro-economic disturbance. Indeed, 
there can be a concern about such systemic effects even from the 
bankruptcy of a single firm -  as in the case of Chrysler -  warranting 
(or at least used to justify) a government bailout. Thus, in the case of 
systemic bankruptcies, the cost of delay is greater, the difficulty of 
quickly resolving the issues is greater, and the capacity to do so is less. 
The balance of concerns -  among ex ante and ex post incentives, and
was reached and the agreement served to stabilize the markets. In the future, it may 
be desirable to include provisions in the securities allowing for a trustee to negotiate 
on behalf of all of the owners of a particular class of securities in the event of a 
standstill.




























































































between incentive, equity, and macroeconomic effects -  is different. We 
want firms not to undertake undue risks, but we presumably do not want 
them to be so risk-averse that they could withstand interest rate and 
exchange rate shocks of the kind Indonesia has experienced; that would 
entail, for instance, a level of leverage far lower than is typical in 
countries with developed capital markets. I would thus argue that there 
is a need for a different bankruptcy regime for large systemic risks 
arising out of macroeconomic disturbances -  a new chapter in the 
bankruptcy code. The essential concern should be restoring or 
maintaining production (or in the case of financial institutions, restoring 
or maintaining the flow of credit). Such a chapter would have simplified 
rules of thumb for allocating claims that could be quickly implemented 
on an across-the-board basis. It would have a greater presumption for 
the retention of control by the existing management, and it would have 
less of a presumption that equity owners should be wiped out.66 
Worrying about appropriate rules -  appropriate burden-sharing -  prior 
to crises and bailouts, rather than the recent practice of waiting until 
after the fact, may be a key to designing equitable and efficient 
workouts.
One occasionally hears the argument that governments should not 
become involved in the resolution of bankruptcies, that these private-to- 
private contracts should be resolved by private parties alone. We have 
argued that this view is simply misguided: bankruptcy law is part of the 
institutional infrastructure of capitalism. Bankruptcy law is an important 
part of setting the rules of the game. And as capital flows becomes 
globalized, the rules of the game have to as well. The question is, can we 
set those rules in ways which reflect the interests of the less developed 
countries as well as the suppliers of capital in the more developed 
countries?
Lender of last resort
Finally, let me come to the fourth question: what role is there for a 
lender of last resort? The original impetus for the founding of the IMF 
was a concern of a lack of liquidity at the national level. Today’s
66 In a sense, this new bankruptcy chapter would be a way of “completing” the 
incomplete contracts. If participants had fully thought through all the contingencies, 
they might have written down a provision describing what should happen if the 
exchange rate falls by more than, say, 25 percent or interest rates rise to more than x 
percent. Every contract could include in it a set of rules for determining what 
happens in the circumstances labeled bankruptcy. There are some significant 
advantages associated with having those rules provided publicly. (The offer of a 
particular set of rules could lead to a process of adverse selection, which would itself 




























































































globalized capital markets have made these issues of even greater 
international concern.
Several issues have been raised: First, with free flows of capital, can the 
international community provide enough liquidity to sustain a currency 
against which there is a run? Indeed, a lender of last resort was not able 
to stave off runs against banks in the Great Depression. Today, we 
recognize that we need more safeguards, notably including deposit 
insurance. And in the case at hand, it is not just the flight of foreign 
capital which is at issue, but of domestic capital as well; in fact, the 
latter has been responsible for much of the capital outflows in recent 
crises. The equivalent to deposit insurance -  a guarantee against 
devaluation -  simply is not feasible.
If one lets the exchange rate float freely, then of course one does not 
need a lender of last resort.The concern is that large fluctuations in 
exchange rates exact a large toll on the economy, and therefore one 
should be willing to pay a significant price to avoid these fluctuations. 
This assumes, as we noted earlier, that one can distinguish between 
movements that are just “noise” and movements that reflect true changes 
in the exchange rate. The former should be eliminated, the latter should 
be allowed.
Again, the required size of the bailout fund depends on what other 
instruments are available to stabilizing the exchange rate and how 
willing the country is to use those instruments. For instance, the action 
typically recommended is raising interest rates, which exacts a high cost 
on the economy (just as exchange rate volatility does). Indeed, the 
evidence is that changes in interest rates are more systematically related 
to financial crises than are changes in exchange rates. The relative 
magnitude of the effects depends, of course, on such variables as the 
foreign exchange exposure of firms and their level of indebtedness, the 
maturity structure of the debt, and the extent to which capital markets 
are segmented.67
When the debt is private, and increases in interest rate have strong 
adverse effects on the economy, such that the probability of default 
increases as the interest rate increases, then increasing the interest rate 
(at least beyond a very small amount) may actually lower the (certainty 
equivalent) expected return, and thus lead to an increased reluctance to 
roll over debt and increased capital flight. Interest rate increases simply 
cannot stymie the flight of capital and stabilize the exchange rate.




























































































From the perspective of international stability the key issue is contagion: 
to what extent will different policies -  bailouts attempting to stabilize 
exchange rates versus greater flexibility in exchange rates -  minimize 
the extent of contagion? One of the concerns arising from the Great 
Depression was the threat of competitive devaluations, and the spectre of 
competitive devaluations has been raised repeatedly in the recent crisis. 
But this argument misses the fundamental difference between 
devaluations in a world o f the gold standard and the current situation. 
Today, changes in exchange rate represent changes in relative prices. 
Not everyone can lower their price relative to each other, though they 
can all lower their price relative to gold. Today, effectively, 
devaluations represent a lowering of a currency’s value relative to the 
dollar. There cannot be a continuing round of competitive devaluations.
There can, of course, be a “struggle” between, say, the countries 
striving to lower their value relative to the dollar and those (the U.S., 
say) that might not want to see the dollar appreciate. But the U.S. can 
presumably respond by lowering interest rates (and if it worries that 
doing so will lead to inflation, because it is already at full employment, 
it can engage in an offsetting fiscal contraction). But note that unlike 
competitive devaluations under the gold standard, which give rise to 
disturbances but have no real effect, a round of interest-rate decreases 
serves to enhance the liquidity of the world economy, reinflating it in 
the face of contractionary pressures. Thus, under the new regimes, the 
“competition” sparked by devaluations may serve to restore strength to 
the world economy.
By contrast, consider the alternative policy response -  bailouts 
organized in an attempt to stabilize exchange rates. An intrinsic problem 
of any lender of last resort is to avoid the moral hazard problem that the 
availability of funds engenders. There needs to be a presumption that a 
bank that runs into a problem is illiquid, not insolvent, and governments 
recognize that deposit insurance itself can give rise to perverse 
incentives. That is why strong supervision is an essential part of any 
system of lender-of-last resort cum deposit insurance. In practice, 
economies with good economic management combine strong regulatory 
oversight with forbearance (that is, discretionary implementation of 
regulations) in the face of a severe downturn.
Similar concerns have made conditionality an essential part of any 
international bailout (though there is little evidence that such 
conditionality actually changes behavior, partly because in critical cases 




























































































new set of problems: conditions that are enforced when they should not 
be.
One example of this is the excessively rigorous implementation of 
capital-adequacy standards, which can lead to the vicious cycle described 
earlier. The balancing of risks associated with forbearance is a political 
decision, involving trade-offs among different risks; and there is no 
reason to believe that different countries will or should make precisely 
the same choices, even under similar circumstances. Most importantly, 
these are not technocratic decisions to be delegated to international 
bureaucrats, no matter how competent they might be. And that is one of 
the reasons that a system of an international lender of last resort will 
probably not work: countries will not be willing to give up their 
sovereignty, to turn over these critical regulatory decisions, to an 
international body, even if that body were in some sense democratically 
accountable.
Another example, at the country level, is the insistence on the quick 
reduction in trade deficits. Without a marked change in exchange rates, 
the only way that this can be accomplished is through a reduction in 
imports, which in turn is engineered through contractionary policies 
that lead to economic downturns (recessions). Of course, at the 
international level, the sum of all trade deficits is zero, and if a few 
countries -  such as Japan and the EU -  insist on pursuing policies that 
lead to large trade surpluses, the rest of the world must (on average) 
have trade deficits. A reduction in one country’s trade deficit must 
increase the trade deficit of another, unless some third country’s trade 
surplus is reduced. We have replaced beggar-thy-neighbor policies 
associated with protectionism and competitive devaluations by a far 
more destructive set of policies: As each country tries to reduce its trade 
deficit, some other country’s trade deficit increases. But while the 
earlier mechanisms involved a strengthening of one’s own economy, 
possibly at the expense of others, in the new regime, the price paid for a 
bailout is the weakening of one’s own economy: economic downturns in 
one country are thereby translated into weaknesses in another, in an 
even more vicious way than under the old regime.
Thus, in evaluating the two alternative mechanisms -  flexible exchange 
rates, possibly with offsetting lowerings of interest rates that help 
reignite the world’s economy, versus a system of relatively fixed 
exchange rates, supported by a lender-of-last resort and successive 
economic recessions as trade deficits are transferred from one country 




























































































On the optimal size of the lender of last resort: The problem of dynamic 
consistency68
If there is a bailout fund, how large should it be? If there is a fire, it is 
hard not to employ all available resources to extinguish it (while taking 
into account the danger that another fire may break out, so that one may 
want to keep some of the fire engines in reserve). But the larger the 
fire-fighting capacity, the greater the moral hazard.
Attention has been directed at two forms of moral hazard -  that of 
countries undertaking excessively risky actions, and that of lenders 
making excessively risky loans. There is a growing consensus that the 
first does not impose a serious problem: while clearly incentives are 
affected, it seems unlikely that the effect is large. On the other hand, 
there is a widespread perception that in recent years lenders have taken 
into account the likelihood of a bailout, at least in their lending activity 
in some countries.
The greater the capacity of the fire department, the lesser the incentive 
to take care. Recognizing this (and the fact that because of externalities 
and a variety of forms of insurance, there is likely to be excessive risk­
taking in any case), fire departments should be organized smaller than 
they would be if there were no incentive effect. In other words, the 
departments should be small enough that someone who looked naively at 
the frequency and magnitude of fires and the marginal benefit and costs 
of increased fire-fighting capacity, but who ignored the incentive 
effects, would be led to believe that the fire department should be 
expanded.
The distortion could be partly corrected by charging a fee from those 
who have a fire (regardless of cause). But doing so creates a new 
problem: one can avoid the fee by putting out the fire on one’s own, and 
therefore any fees generate an incentive to delay calling the fire 
department, thus exacerbating the conflagration.
Actions by lenders
I have focused my attention on actions that borrowers (the less 
developed countries) can undertake -  either on their own or else 
collectively in collaboration with the more advanced countries -  to help 
stabilize capital flows, to correct the market failures, or to mitigate their 
consequences. But the preceding section has focused on the establishment




























































































of a lender of last resort -  a bailout fund -  that would presumably be 
financed by the more developed countries. To the extent that there are 
costs of providing the bailouts, there are costs borne by the advanced 
countries for which they should make the beneficiaries, the lenders in 
their own country, pay. Just as depositors have to pay a premium on 
their deposits for deposit insurance, in this view lenders should be 
forced to pay a premium (perhaps adjusted for risk), which could be 
used to fund the bailout fund.69
69 Presumably the magnitude of the fee would depend on the magnitude of the 
discrepancy between social and private returns to lenders, which would depend on a 
number of variables, including the bankruptcy regime, the size of bailouts, and the 




























































































I have outlined in this lecture many of the key elements of a new 
international architecture. There is a growing sense that all is not well 
with the current system. It has resulted in more frequent and larger 
crises, each of which imposes a huge toll that may last years into the 
future and that is not distributed evenly. The frequency and depth of 
these crisis suggests that more than government policies are to blame: 
something is wrong with the architecture. Indeed, if anything, 
policymakers today in the developing world are more economically 
literate and sophisticated than those of a quarter century ago and we 
would therefore expect that their policies would have improved over 
time.70
In my recent lecture before the Commonwealth Ministers of Finance in 
Ottawa, I went even further and argued that “[t]he situation is 
intolerable. We have an international economic architecture that has led 
to more frequent crises, and yet our means of responding have proven 
inadequate. While there is much talk about pain, the poor have absorbed 
more than their share of the pain without sharing commensurately in the 
promised gain.”
All too often, attention has been focused on exchange rates, inflation 
rates, trade and fiscal deficits, capital flows and interest rates, and 
officials boast of their achievements when they manage to stabilize these 
variables. But these are not the variables that are of interest: what 
matters is economic performance -  output, employment, incomes -  and 
stabilizing exchange rates does little good if output and incomes continue 
to plummet. The focus on the financial variables is a classic case of 
confusing means with ends.
But even more important is the fact that behind the statistics lie people, 
individuals and families whose lives and livelihoods depend on the 
economic policies and structures we put into place. Long after the 
exchange rate between the rupiah and dollar in November 1997 or the 
baht in July 1997 have become a distant memory, the scars will still be 
there. And I am not talking about the losses suffered by currency 
traders who gambled on the stability of the exchange rate and lost, but 
those within the country whose education has been stopped, and the 
children whose development has been stunted through malnourishment.
70 To be sure, democratic institutions may impose new constraints on the actions of 
policymakers, which may have adverse effects on, say, economic stability. But the 
architecture itself must take account not only of human fallibility, but of the nature of 
the political system.




























































































Already, data on Indonesia are showing a significant drop in birth 
weights, which is an indicator of malnourishment during the prenatal 
period and a precursor to an abundance of later-life problems.
Behind these problems lie a host of market failures, discrepancies 
between social and private costs and benefits. Arguably, these market 
failures have grown over time, partly because of misguided attempts at 
financial and capital market liberalization, which have failed to 
recognize the role that regulation plays in aligning private and social 
returns. The increasingly large bailouts are both a symptom of, and a 
cause of, these burgeoning problems. As I noted in the introduction, the 
frequent bailouts, the worries abut systemic risks and contagion -  all are 
evidence of large discrepancies between social and private returns, or 
large externalities. Just as in the arena of our ecological environment, 
where the market failures associated with large externalities have given 
rise to beneficial government interventions, so too is there a need for 
action in the arena of our global economic environment. The market 
failures associated with the large externalities necessitate stronger 
actions, ones that go beyond the often simplistic palliatives of improved 
information and prudential regulation and the elimination of distortions 
that exacerbate die externalities. Those actions are desirable, and in 
some cases progress in these areas will be slow and difficult; but we 
should not confuse the difficulties of progress in this arena with the 
fruits that they will bear. It should be clear that even if we were fully 
successful in these reforms, they are not enough; we deceive ourselves if 
we think they are.
In this lecture, I have presented an outline of some of the goals and 
principles of the new architecture;
Goals of reform
The overarching goal of reform should be to improve social welfare -  
paying due attention especially to the costs of risk, when there are 
imperfect institutions for sharing and absorbing risks, and to 
distributional objectives. The reforms must aim to reduce market 
failures and lessen the consequences of these failures. But, more 
specifically, within the reform agenda, we can identify three necessary 
pillars of reform:
• Crisis prevention: making crises less likely. Most of what I have 
talked about in this lecture has focused on reforms that, for instance, 
dampen volatile short-term capital flows. Such reforms may serve 




























































































extra room for maneuver to pursue policies that maintain the 
strength of the domestic economy. But at least one central goal is to 
insulate these economies, if ever so slightly, from the vicissitudes of 
international capital markets, which have imposed high costs even on 
countries that have pursued sound economic policies.
• Crisis responses that reduce the consequences for the real sector, and 
especially for the poor. No matter how successful we are in building 
an architecture that reduces the likelihood of crises, we will not be 
able to eliminate them. The costs of crises when they occur depend 
on how we respond to them. Designing response strategies is 
difficult: there is always a great deal of uncertainty about the 
consequences of economic policies, and this is especially true when 
one is trying to predict the reactions of investors.71 Well-designed 
policies must take into account this uncertainty, as well as the lags in 
responses, the asymmetries in losses, the non-linearities in the 
economy’s structures, and the irreversibilities (hysteresis) in the 
economy’s behavior. One implication is that in the face of a serious 
threat of a major economic downturn, the focus of response must be 
to maintain the overall macro- strength of the economy.72 73 (And 
indeed, to the extent that lack of confidence is viewed to be the 
underlying problem, it is hard to see how confidence in an economy 
or its currency can be reestablished as the economy plummets into a 
deep recession or depression.) There is a growing consensus, for 
instance, that at least part of the losses associated with the East Asian 
crisis can be attributed to misguided policies -  misguided in the ex 
post sense in that they were almost certainly too contractionary, and 
almost certainly (though more controversially) misguided in the ex 
ante sense in that they did not take fully into account the above 
factors.
• Safety nets. No matter how good we are at responding and how 
equitably we design response packages, crises will lead to 
unemployment, and almost inevitably the poor will bear a large share 
of the adjustment costs. This, at least, has certainly been the case in 
the past.77 In most less developing countries, safety nets are weak or 
absent. In East Asia, full employment was the safety net. In many 
developing countries, the very process of development weakens 
traditional safety nets, and this occurs before new, more formal risk­
71 Keynes’ reference to their unpredictable behavior in his use of the term “animal 
spirits” should have provided a word of caution to those who overconfidently 
predicted how “markets" would react to particular policy packages. See Furman and 
Stiglitz (1998).
72 For a more extensive discussion of the design of responses, see Stiglitz (1998b).




























































































sharing institutions are put into place. Thus, a third essential pillar of 
reform is the construction of more effective safety nets.
Principles of reform
This lecture has set out several principles to guide the reforms:
• The architecture (using the term broadly to include all three pillars) 
must recognize human fallibility.
• The architecture must pay due attention to the social and political 
consequences and must lead to an equitable sharing of the burden of 
adjustment: even if one did not value these in their own right, one 
should recognize that they are necessary for political and social 
instability. Without political and social stability, it is impossible to 
restore either the strength of or confidence in the economy.
• The architecture must pay due attention to the political process; 
otherwise, reforms will not be politically sustainable. The welcome 
democratic reforms that have occurred in many countries have at the 
same time put into place complex political dynamics. We must not 
ignore these dynamics.
• The key goal of reform should be to reduce risk, increase economic 
security, and increase economic efficiency -  including reducing the 
disparity between social and private benefits and costs and reducing 
market failures and their consequences. In thinking about the goals of 
reform, it is imperative that we not confuse means with ends. Capital 
market liberalization and financial market liberalization are not ends 
in themselves. Advocates of these reforms need to justify them by 
showing how they achieve these broader goals. As we have seen, 
these liberalizations -  at least if not executed with better attention to 
sequencing, pacing, and broader institutional development than has 
often been the case in the past -  may be an important source of the 
increasing instability in less developed countries.
• Most importantly, we need to keep a balance among prevention, 
response, and safety nets: the weaker the safety net, the more 
important it is not to expose a country to excessive risk and to design 
responses that limit the burden imposed on the poor. In recent years, 
typical responses imposed even on countries with weak safety nets 
have resulted in the poor bearing a heavy burden. The implication is 
that unless and until we can design safety nets and response functions 
that lead to more equitable burden-sharing, we should take great care 
to design architectures that limit risk. Recent discussions have 
focused on how to limit risks, recognizing that one needs to have 
strong financial institutions before one can engage in financial and 




























































































greater caution: even with strong financial institutions, many of the 
shocks facing countries come from outside the country, and even 
countries with reasonably strong financial institutions will encounter 
difficulties in dealing with the shocks. There almost surely will still 
be financial crises. Thus, a country’s willingness to bear these shocks 
must be tempered by a realistic assessment of whether it can respond 
to these shocks in ways that limit the damage and whether it has 
safety nets that can lessen the costs borne by workers, small 
businessmen, and others.
Setting one's sights
I have argued that there are interventions that can raise welfare. In 
evaluating these interventions, our sights should be modest. As one of 
my friends put it, on a rainy day, a leaky umbrella is better than none at 
all. Or, to switch metaphors, a dam serves a useful purpose if it stops 
most floods. It is true that the water will eventually make its way from 
the top of the mountains down to the ocean, but a good dam -  one 
designed with spillways and escape routes -  stabilizes the flow. In doing 
so, it can both reduce risk and increase overall productivity.
We should not allow ideology to be the enemy of the pragmatic and 
realistic, just as we should not allow the perfect to be the enemy of the 
good.
The swinging pendulum
Today, we face two dangers. From one side, we risk being led by the 
ostriches, with heads buried in the sand, who do not see the fundamental 
problems that they may not face in the security of their own lives, but to 
which millions of the poor have now been exposed. But on the other 
flank, we are threatened also by a growing fringe that fails to recognize 
the potential benefits that the market economy can bring, not only to the 
suppliers of capital, but to workers as well. Our task is to look out for 
and try to constrain the swinging pendulum of opinion. Part of the 
underlying problem we face today is that during the reforms of the past 
two decades, the advocates of die market economy let the pendulum 
swing too far on one side. In pushing market-opening, they failed to 
emphasize sufficiently the importance of certain market and non-market 
institutions that make the market work better in developed countries. 
These institutions have not only improved the shock-absorption capacity 
of the system as a whole, but have also enhanced the ability of even the 
poor to withstand those shocks. But in the coming months, as the costs 




























































































pendulum swinging too far to the other side. The impact of this swing 
could be a complete withdrawal from globalization.
Our goal must be to strive to reach a new balance, one that recognizes 
that today’s architecture has shattered the lives of millions and millions 
of people, that we collectively have a responsibility to do more to 
minimize that damage, and that the well-being of the poor must be a 
core concern in the design of the new architecture. We should have a 
simple criterion: Will that reform make the poor and their children be 
better off, and will it reduce the risks they face? Finally, will the risks 
they are asked to face justify the gains that they -  not someone in a far­
away country, nor even some wealthy entrepreneur in their own capital 
city who quickly sends his money abroad at the first suggestion of 
trouble -  that they, the poor, actually receive?74
74 Or to put it more blandly, in the language of economists, policies need to be 
evaluated using an egalitarian social welfare function. In evaluating which policies 
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